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Welfare programs confront policy makers with
tradeoffs among conflicting objectives. Programs
that alleviate need among the poor can lead to
dependency. Desires to promote work in order to
reduce dependency must confront the fact that ben-
efits must fall as earnings rise unless the program is
to be universal.This creates a work disincentive.
Starting in the 1960s, US policymakers struggled to
fashion a program of cash assistance that would alle-
viate need among the poor while promoting work
and limiting dependency. By the early 1990s, a series
of reforms focused squarely on promoting work and
limiting aid. Here we describe briefly the policy
reforms that were geared toward promoting work
and the empirical evidence of the effects those
reforms had on employment.Much of this material is
drawn from our forthcoming book, which goes into
more detail and covers a much broader range of out-
comes (Grogger and Karoly in press). One topic not
discussed there, however, is how welfare reform
affected wages.Here we discuss the limited evidence
on wage effects and the importance of wages for
determining the terms of the tradeoff among differ-
ent policy objectives.
Prior to the passage of the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Restoration Act of 1996
(PRWORA), the primary US welfare program was
called Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC).Like welfare programs everywhere,AFDC
was available only to the poor.Unlike such programs
in many countries,AFDC was intended primarily for
single parents with co-resident children, with 93 per-
cent of all aid going to families headed by single
mothers.AFDC was an entitlement program, mean-
ing that aid had to be provided to all eligible families
who sought it. Funding was shared between the fed-
eral government and the states.The states set bene-
fit levels, which varied widely. Despite differences in
benefit levels, recipients in all states faced the same
implicit tax rate when they went to work.The statu-
tory tax rate was 100 percent after four months of
work, which provided a clear disincentive for recipi-
ents to work.
In response to rising caseloads and concerns about
employment disincentives and the effect of AFDC
on family structure, several states sought and
received permission to change their welfare pro-
grams beginning in the early 1990s. Momentum for
nationwide reform gained steadily until the passage
of PRWORA in August 1996. PWRORA ended the
entitlement status of the welfare program and
replaced AFDC with Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF). It gave states leeway to
change their programs in ways not possible under
AFDC. Many of the changes undertaken by the
states were designed to promote work.
Major policy changes during the 1990s
During the 1990s, the states changed their welfare
programs in ways that are literally too numerous to
mention. Of all the policy changes, financial incen-
tives, work requirements and time limits probably
had the greatest effect on work behavior.We discuss
each in turn.
Financial incentives
Whereas AFDC imposed high tax rates on recipi-
ents’ earnings uniformly across the country, states
now differ a great deal in the rate at which they
reduce recipients’ benefits as their earnings grow.A
few have maintained the old AFDC tax structure,
but most have adopted lower tax rates. Connecticut
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has the most generous financial incentive in the
country, allowing recipients to keep their full bene-
fits until their earnings exceed the federal poverty
line, which amounts to $1,268 per month for a single
parent with two children as of 2004.
Financial incentives provide an incentive for non-
working welfare recipients to begin working. How-
ever, because they involve conflicting income and
substitution effects, their effects on hours of work
are more complicated.
Work requirements
Work requirements mandate that recipients work 
– or engage in “work related activities” – as a con-
dition for receiving aid. Not surprisingly, theory
predicts that such requirements should increase
employment among welfare recipients. The extent
to which they increase work may depend on the
nature of the welfare-to-work program, according
to which non-working recipients satisfy their work
requirement. During the 1990s, states largely re-
placed their skills-focused programs, which stressed
education and training, with placement-focused
programs,which stressed search and rapid employ-
ment. Placement-focused programs may have
greater effects in the short-run, while skills-fo-
cused programs occupy their students with class-
room activities.If those classroom activities impart
valuable skills, however, skills-focused programs
could boost wages and result in larger long-run
effects.
Time limits
Time limits represent the most radical departure
from past welfare policy. Whereas AFDC allowed
families to receive aid as long as they remained eli-
gible, federal TANF funds cannot be used to pro-
vide benefits for more than 60 months over the
recipient’s lifetime. Many states have adopted even
stricter time limits. Time limits could have both
behavioral and mechanical effects. Behaviorally,
time limits provide consumers with an incentive to
bank their benefits for later use, even before 
the time limit becomes binding (Grogger and
Michalopoulos 2003).This behavioral response may
also increase employment. Once the consumer ex-
hausts her benefits, she may be removed from the
welfare rolls.This should mechanically reduce wel-
fare receipt, but its effect on employment is inde-
terminate.
Data
Theory predicts that all of the major reforms
described above should increase employment. To
test these predictions, we assembled data from 35
studies of the effects of specific welfare reform poli-
cies or welfare reform as a whole on employment.
Among these studies, 29 are experimental and 6 are
observational.
The experiments involved random assignment of
welfare recipients to treatment and control regimes,
where the control regime was AFDC and the treat-
ment regime involved one or more of the reforms
described above.We classify the experiments accord-
ing to their major reform or combination of reforms.
The observational studies typically involved analyses
of data on welfare-prone populations, such as single
mothers, from nationwide samples such as the
Current Population Survey. The effects of welfare
reform are identified in these studies largely from
differences in the timing and nature of the states’
reform policies, either specific reforms – namely
financial incentives and time limits – or reform as a
bundle. All of the studies whose results we tally
included state dummies in an attempt to capture
unobservable differences between the states that
may influence both welfare policy and employment.
Likewise, all included a state-level measure of eco-
nomic performance in an attempt to distinguish the
effects of the economy from the effects of welfare
reform. Finally, these studies included controls for
year effects in order to capture nationwide trends in
factors that may have influenced employment
among at-risk groups, such as negative media por-
trayals of welfare.
Results
The Table presents a tally of the qualitative results
from experimental and observational studies of the
effect of specific reforms or reform as a bundle on
employment.1 We think of these as reflecting the
short-run effects of welfare reform, because the
experimental results are based on roughly two years
1 These are the same studies whose quantitative results are dis-
cussed in Chapter 6 and whose qualitative results are tallied in
Chapter 10 of Grogger and Karoly (in press).Note that some stud-
ies contribute more than one count to the results in the Table.Some
experimental studies examined employment impacts for two popu-
lations: longer-term welfare recipients and recent welfare appli-
cants. A few observational studies estimated effects of more than
one specific reform policy or both a specific reform policy and
reform as a bundle. Two experimental studies contribute experi-
mental results for reform as a bundle, as well as observational
results for the mechanical effect of time limits.of follow-up data and the observational studies
rarely include more than two or three years of post-
reform data. The theory discussed above predicted
that all of the major reforms should increase
employment, and by and large, the theory is borne
out by the data. Of the 44 estimates reflected in the
Table, 40 are positive. Of the four that are not posi-
tive, two pertain to the mechanical effects of time
limits, about which theory has the least to say.
Among the 40 positive estimates, 31 are statistically
significant at the 10 percent level or better. This is
many more than one would expect by chance.
Not reflected in the table are some important qual-
ifications. First, the quantitative effects of these
reforms are generally modest in magnitude. The
studies typically show that reform raises employ-
ment by roughly 5 to 10 percent.This is not a triv-
ial amount,but neither can it be said to represent a
fundamental change in behavior. Second, there is
some evidence that these effects fade out over
time. Eleven of the experiments that focused on
work requirements provide five-year follow-up
data. In the first two years of these experiments,
work requirements increased employment by an
average of 4.8 percentage points. By the last two
years, the average effect had fallen to 2.0 percent-
age points.
Policy tradeoffs and the importance of wages
One way to summarize the results in the Table is that
almost any reform undertaken led to increases in
employment, albeit modest increases that may not
have lasted too long.This provides some policy guid-
ance. It shows that, since modest employment gains
can be achieved from any of a number of policies,the
real tradeoff policy makers face is
between alleviating need and lim-
iting dependence.In Grogger and
Karoly (in press), we show that
financial incentives raise incomes,
but that they also raise welfare
use, since they give consumers an
incentive to combine work and
welfare rather than leave welfare
altogether.We also show that time
limits and work requirements re-
duce welfare receipt, but have lit-
tle if any effect on the mean in-
comes of recipients.Thus the pol-
icy tradeoffs involve financial in-
centives,which raise employment and incomes at the
expense of higher welfare receipt, versus time limits
or work requirements, which raise employment and
reduce welfare receipt but have little salutary effect
on income.
Two further questions follow from these results.The
first is,what would be needed to make the short-term
employment gains seen above last longer? The sec-
ond is, what would be needed to lessen the terms of
the tradeoff between the conflicting goals of alleviat-
ing need, limiting dependency and promoting work?
The answer to both involves wages.
If welfare reform were to raise recipients’ wages,then
short-term employment gains should persist into the
future, since higher wages make employment more
attractive. Furthermore, positive wage effects can
ease some of the short-term policy tradeoffs between
alleviating need, limiting dependency and promoting
work. If the wages of recipients rise with work expe-
rience, then policies that promote work may have
favorable effects on earnings over the long-term,
even if they have no such effect in the short term.
Thus work requirements and time limits could even-
tually raise earnings and income, in addition to
reducing welfare receipt and raising employment
immediately. Similarly, the short-term increase in
welfare receipt that stems from financial incentives
may eventually dissipate, if wage growth eventually
leads recipients to leave the welfare rolls altogether.
The key question is whether reform raises wages.
Conceivably, it could do so either directly or indi-
rectly.If welfare-to-work programs raised recipients’
productivity, for example, by providing additional
education or training, the result could be higher
wages. However, most states implemented place-
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Financial incentives E – – 1 1 1 
O – –  – – 1 
Work requirements E – 1 – 3 9 
Financial incentives combined
with workrequirements  E  –  –  –  3  9 
Time limits (behavioral) O  –  –  –  –  3 
Time limits (mechanical) O  –  2  –  –  1 
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ment-oriented welfare-to-work programs during the
1990s, so direct productivity effects seem unlikely.
Welfare reform also could raise wages indirectly by
increasing employment, if welfare recipients enjoy
positive returns to work experience.This question is
surprisingly controversial. Although human capital
theory predicts that wages should rise with experi-
ence, there is mixed evidence on whether low-skill
workers such as welfare recipients enjoy the same
returns to work experience as their higher-skill
counterparts.
Among studies that focus on the low-skill population
generally, results vary depending on how one mea-
sures experience. Studies that employ a traditional
potential experience measure, typically defined as
age minus education, generally report little if any
return to experience (Burtless 1995; Moffitt and
Rangarajan 1989;Pavetti and Acs 1997).Studies that
employ a measure of actual experience, that is, the
number of months or years of work experience since
the worker finished school, report returns more
comparable to those observed among more general
samples of workers (Gladden and Taber 1999; Loeb
and Corcoran 2001).
However, four recent studies that analyze the actual
experience of welfare participants report conflicting
estimates of the return to experience.Grogger (2005)
analyzes data from the four-year follow-up of the
Florida Family Transition (FTP) program. He esti-
mates that former welfare recipients enjoy returns to
experience of roughly 5.6 percent per year. Zabel,
Schwartz and Donald (2004) analyze data from the
18-, 36-, and 54-month follow-up surveys of the Self-
Sufficiency Project (SSP). They estimate returns to
experience between 7.3 and 9.6 percent. In contrast,
Card,Michalopoulos and Robins (2001),who analyze
data from the 36-month follow-up of SSP, estimate
returns between 2 and 3 percent. Finally, Card and
Hyslop (2004, 15) report that “work experience at-
tributable to SSP appears to have had no detectable
effect on wage opportunities”based on an analysis of
data from the 54-month follow-up.
Why these estimates differ so widely is not clear.
Three of the studies are based on data from the same
demonstration project, which one might expect to
increase the similarity of their results. At the same
time, they employ different approaches to deal with
self-selection into employment and different meth-
ods to handle the potential endogeneity of work
experience. Given the importance of the question
they address, further research into the differences
between these studies would be useful.
Even if welfare recipients enjoy returns to experi-
ence similar to those observed among higher-skilled
workers, there remains the question of whether the
experience gains that result from welfare reform are
enough to spur meaningful wage growth. FTP in-
creased experience by about three months over a
four-year period (Grogger 2005). SSP raised experi-
ence by about four months over five-and-a-half
years (Card and Hyslop 2004). Even if the return to
experience is 7 percent, employment gains along
these lines (which are fairly large by the standards of
the experimental literature) would translate into
small wage gains. Put differently, in order for wage
growth to ameliorate the trade-offs among the con-
flicting goals of welfare reform, reform would have
to result in much larger employment gains than we
have generally observed.
Conclusions
Raising employment is a key objective of many wel-
fare policy makers around the world. Economic the-
ory predicts that it should be possible to raise work
effort either using “sticks”, such as work require-
ments and time limits, or “carrots”, such as financial
incentives. Results from dozens of welfare reform
studies largely bear this prediction out.
At the same time, those studies reveal that the mag-
nitude of those effects tends to be modest.This find-
ing has important implications, particularly for the
long term. Policy reformers often speak of work as
first step toward a “virtuous cycle” by which recipi-
ents eventually leave the welfare rolls. The idea is
that increased employment leads to higher wages,
which in turn result in greater work effort and even-
tually higher incomes. In order for the virtue to start
cycling,however,today’s work must generate tomor-
row’s wage gains. This, in turn, requires that wages
grow with experience and that experience grows
enough to generate meaningful wage gains.
Recent work has provided mixed results regarding
the return to experience facing low-skill workers
such as welfare recipients. Perhaps more important-
ly, the experience gains generated by welfare reform
experiments seem unlikely to lead to substantial
wage gains, even if the return to experience is high.Relying on increased experience alone is likely to
result in only limited wage gains. Thus, with the
prospects for substantial wage growth in doubt, the
policy tradeoffs between alleviating need, limiting
dependency and promoting work can be expected to
dominate future welfare reform debates.
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